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Introduction
Few areas of Chinese law can rival the attention that the Anti-Monop-
oly Law (AML) has drawn at home and abroad since its enactment on
August 1, 2008.1  In China, the AML has long been heralded as the eco-
nomic constitution.2  Academics and the Chinese public have high expecta-
† Lecturer in Law, King’s College London.  I am deeply grateful to many
individuals at various government organizations, judges as well as lawyers in China who
helped me carry out the research for this article.  I have promised absolute
confidentiality to them and thus cannot thank them by name.  I am also indebted to
Judge Posner, Susan Shirk, Daniel Sokol, David Evans, Wentong Zheng, Curtis Milhaupt,
Nicholas Howson, Randy Peerenboom, Haibo He, Sida Liu, Christopher Townley,
Wouter Wils, Steve Harris and Michael Dowdle for helpful comments and discussion.  I
also thank workshop participants at King’s College London and Cornell Law School for
stimulating discussions on prior drafts and presentations of this article.  All errors are
mine.  The Article is subject to revision and I welcome comments and criticism.  Email:
angela.zhang@kcl.ac.uk
1. See Fan Longduan Fa [Antimonopoly Law] [hereinafter the AML] (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008),
available at: http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_172541
69.htm.
2. Youngjin Jung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China, 24 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 107, 107– 08 (2003).
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tions that the AML will help remove regional trade barriers and stimulate
the reform of state-owned firms (SOEs).3  Globalization has also triggered
a surge in foreign demand for understanding the AML.  The extraterritorial
effects of the law allow Chinese antitrust authorities to intervene in off-
shore merger transactions and anti-competitive behaviours conducted over-
seas solely on the basis of their impact on China, i.e., sales to the Chinese
market.4  As China is an essential part of the global market, the enforce-
ment of the AML has begun to affect multinational companies in terms of
their strategies and manner of doing business both inside and outside of
China.
Existing studies typically view the adoption and implementation of
the AML as a response by Chinese policymakers to a changing economic
and foreign policy environment.5  Such a view appears to stem from the
notion that the AML enforcement outcome is a result of reasoned debates
among a cohesive group of Chinese policymakers who have the single, uni-
fying goal of maximizing national interest.6  For instance, scholars and
practitioners observe that China’s entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 2001 suddenly revived and accelerated the effort to draft the
AML and that there appeared to be “a broad consensus” at the time that
China needed the AML to protect against the anticompetitive practices of
multinational firms.7  This legislative background, coupled with the ambi-
guity of the objectives in the AML’s text,8 has led many to believe that the
Chinese government will use the AML as “an instrument of industrial pol-
icy” to benefit domestic firms and consumers at the expense of foreign
3. The World Bank & Development Research Center of the State Council, China
2030: Building A Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society, 118– 20 (2012),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/China-
2030-complete.pdf [hereinafter World Bank Report 2030].
4. The AML, supra note 1, art. 2.  See also Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang, Toward
An Extraterritorial Application for the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law that Avoids Trade Con-
flict, 45 GEORGE WASH. INT’L L. REV. 501, 526– 28 (2013).
5. See, e.g., Bruce M. Owen et al., Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive Com-
patibility, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123, 126– 128 (2005) (discussing the economic
context in which the AML may be enforced); Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in
China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643,
652– 71 (2010) (elaborating three economic forces that shape Chinese competition law
and policy: China’s current transitional stage, its market structures, and pervasive state
control in the economy); Deng Fei & Gregory K. Leonard, The Role of China’s Unique
Economic Characteristics in Antitrust Enforcement, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE
FIRST FIVE YEARS 59, 60– 73 (Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass eds., 2013) (outlining a
number of the characteristics of the Chinese economy that could shape the enforcement
of the AML).
6. This is similar to the rationality model some political scientists have adopted to
explain Chinese politics. See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING
IN CHINA: LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 9– 14 (1988).
7. H. Stephen Harris Jr., The Making of An Antitrust Law: The Pending of the Anti-
Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 176– 83 (2006).
8. Pingping Shan et al., China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What Is the Welfare Standard,
41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 31, 34– 37 (2012) (discussing a number of provisions in the AML
that could lead to conflicting goals and welfare standards).
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companies.9  Moreover, given China’s current transitional stage, distorted
market structure, and pervasive state control, scholars and practitioners
also predict that the AML will have limited application to Chinese domestic
firms, particularly SOEs.10
For sure, the above literature significantly advances our understanding
of the economic forces shaping antitrust policy in China.  But the actual
enforcement of the AML has yielded a far more complicated picture than
the conventional analysis had predicted.  Since the AML’s enactment in
2008, Chinese enforcement agencies have not only applied the AML to
large multinational companies, but have also frequently applied it to pri-
vate domestic firms and SOEs.11  Moreover, some enforcement agencies
have vowed to focus their enforcement efforts in a number of areas that are
dominated by large state-owned monopolies, such as those within the oil,
banking, and telecommunication industries.12  This disparity between the
predictions of the existing literature and the actual enforcement pattern
therefore demands an explanation.
The purpose of this Article is to provide such an explanation.  It
argues that the main problem with the existing literature is its failure to
closely study the operation of the Chinese government bureaucracy and
the incentives of the government actors involved.  As Douglas North once
stated: “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally,
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”13  As a
form of human interaction, law enforcement is no exception; it operates
within the constraints devised by a country’s specific political and eco-
nomic institutions.  But the existing literature focuses primarily on the eco-
nomic conditions pertaining to the creation and enforcement of the AML,
paying scant attention to China’s bureaucratic structure and policy-making
processes.  Notably, while some scholars have recently started to adopt an
institutional design perspective to study AML enforcement, they have yet to
situate institutional dynamics in a broader political and economic
context.14
9. See, e.g., Nathan Bush & Yue Bo, Disentangling Industrial Policy and Competition
Policy in China, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 2– 4 (Feb. 2011) (noting that the ambiguous text of
the AML invites regulators to consider non-antitrust factors and that industrial policy is
likely to prevail over antitrust policy in times of conflict); Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao,
Merger Control Policy under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 41 REV. INDUS. ORG. 109, 111– 12
(2012) (noting the growing sentiments of economic patriotism and the rising concern
that foreign firms’ dominance in China was among the driving factors behind the adop-
tion of the AML and the prohibition decision of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan).
10. See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 5, at 671– 720; see also Fei & Leonard, supra note 5,
at 60– 64.
11. See infra Part III on NDRC’s recent antitrust investigations involving various eco-
nomic actors.
12. See Kazunori Takada, China Could Target Oil Firms, Telecoms, Banks in Price
Probes, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2013), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/15/uk-china-
antitrust-ndrc-idUKBRE97E04W20130815.
13. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 3 (2003).
14. See generally Angela Huyue Zhang, The Enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly
Law: An Institutional Design Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 631 (2011); Yong Huang &
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In a departure from previous analyses, this Article is the first attempt
to conduct an in-depth investigation of Chinese bureaucratic politics in
order to analyze how these dynamics affect the outcome of antitrust
enforcement in China.  It has two major findings.  First, bureaucratic polit-
ics have a powerful impact on the allocation of economic resources in
China, which in turn determines how monopolies arise in the Chinese
market.  Second, the bureaucratic structure and political processes of deci-
sion-making shape the incentive structures of administrative agencies, thus
affecting how they regulate the economic activities of various actors in the
economy.  “The direction of causality runs from politics to economics, not
the other way around,” argues Yasheng Huang, a leading expert on Chinese
political economy.15  Contrary to the conventional notion that Chinese
policymakers have a single, unifying goal to maximize national interests,
the Article finds that Chinese antitrust enforcement outcomes largely result
from a struggle among government agencies which decide antitrust issues
in terms of the personal consequence for their stature and power.  The
claim here is not that Chinese AML is free of protectionism and discrimina-
tion— far from it, as will be elaborated upon in detail below.  The claim is
that the complexity of China’s bureaucratic structure, policy process, and
incentives of government agencies leads to a far more heterogeneous
enforcement outcome than the existing literature predicts.
One caveat must be entered here.  The institutional approach pro-
posed in this Article does not intend to provide a complete explanation of
every antitrust decision made by Chinese administrative agencies.  What it
does seek to show, however, is that the pattern of China’s antitrust enforce-
ment over the past five years can best be understood by examining the
bureaucratic incentives of enforcement agencies embedded in China’s
unique political system.
This Article builds upon three strands of literature.  The first strand is
the economic theories of organizations, particularly studies on incomplete
contracting and moral hazard, which have been applied to study the design
of incentives of government bureaucracy.16  The second strand is political
Richean Zhiyan Li, An Overview of Chinese Competition Policy: Between Fragmentation
and Consolidation, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 5, at
3, 6– 11; Qian Hao, The Multiple Hands: Institutional Dynamics of China’s Competition
Regime, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 5, at 15, 15– 34;
Jessica Su & Xiaoye Wang, China: The Competition Law System and the Country’s Norms,
in THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES 194,
199– 206 (Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
15. See YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND INVESTMENT CONTROL IN CHINA [xix](1996)
(Although Huang’s argument is based on his observation of the political control of
China’s monetary policy, it also applies strikingly well in this context).
16. See, e.g., Jean Triole, THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT, 46 Oxford
Economic Papers 1 (1994) (discussing, generally, these economic theories); see generally
AVINASH K. DIXIT, THE MAKING OF ECONOMIC POLICY: A TRANSACTION-COST POLITICS PER-
SPECTIVE 61– 106 (1998); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L.
REV. 47 (1969); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND
WHY THEY DO IT xviii– xix (2d. ed. 1989); Richard A. Posner, From the New Institutional
Economics to Organization Economics: With Applications to Corporate Governance, Gov-
ernment Agencies, and Legal Institutions, 6 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1,1– 8 (2010).
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scientists’ rich description and deep analysis of China’s bureaucratic struc-
ture and policymaking process.17  This is combined with a third strand of
literature exploring Chinese economic institutions, such as studies on eco-
nomic decentralization and fragmentation.18  Integrating incentive theory
into the study of Chinese political economy is important because the
incentive structure is key to understanding China’s policymaking process
and its market structure today.  This Article also benefits from information
gathered from extensive interviews with officials from various government
departments and organizations, judges, and lawyers who have been closely
involved in Chinese antitrust practice.19
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I begins by posing the funda-
mental question as to why the political decision-making process matters in
the Chinese context.  Part II studies the bureaucratic structure and poli-
cymaking process by exploring a peculiar phenomenon in Chinese anti-
trust enforcement: the coordination between Chinese enforcement agencies
and other government organizations during antitrust enforcement.  This is
particularly evident in merger control as the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) regularly confers with other govern-
ment agencies during merger review.  Part III examines the incentive struc-
ture of central enforcement agencies and seeks answers to the following
questions: why does the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) appear more
aggressive in antitrust enforcement than the Antimonopoly and Anti-Unfair
Competition Enforcement Bureau at the State Administration for Industry
and Commerce (SAIC)?  And what has incentivized NDRC to establish an
enforcement priority of tackling price-related behaviour in certain indus-
trial sectors?  Part IV examines the local enforcement agencies’ enforce-
ment records, their incentive structures, and the constraints they face
during enforcement.
I. Why Bureaucratic Politics Matter
In his seminal paper “The Nature of the Firm,” Ronald Coase posed
17. See, e.g., LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 11– 19; see generally SUSAN L.
SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 92– 128 (1993); see also Ken-
neth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limi-
tations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA 1– 6
(Kenneth Lieberthal & David Lampton eds., 1992); Andrew C. Mertha, “Fragmented
Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process, 200 CHINA Q.
995, 995– 96 (2009); VICTOR SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA: ELITE CONFLICT AND
INFLATION 2 (2009).
18. See generally Gabriella Montinola, Federalism, Chinese Style: the Political Basis for
Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POLITICS 50 (1995); see also YASHENG HUANG, SELL-
ING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA 260– 307(2003); see also
Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1076 (2011).
19. As those individuals who agreed to be interviewed wish to remain anonymous,
the Article will only identify the interviewees with very general terms of institutional
affiliation.
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the fundamental question of why firms exist.20  In an ideal world where
economic actors can effortlessly transact with each other, firms are not
needed in the first place as every activity could be organized using market
transactions.  In the practical context, firms exist because transacting in
the market is costly; thus, a hierarchical structure, like a firm, arises to
overcome these market failures and creates efficiency by reducing transac-
tion costs.21  Meanwhile, the boundaries of the firm are determined by the
point where internal organization is more efficient than external
contracting.22
Coase’s finding that firms operate as hierarchies illuminates the gov-
ernance structure that China’s Communist Party (CCP) adopted to operate
the Chinese economy during the early years of its rule.  Modelled after the
Soviet Union, the whole Chinese economy was turned into a gigantic firm
in the 1950s and all economic activities were decided by command and
control. As there was no market, there was no competition and no need for
antitrust law.  Thus, antitrust law only became necessary when China
opened its economy and embarked on market reform.  However, this
change was only possible after the Chinese leadership successfully over-
came ideological obstacles by shifting from a dogmatic emphasis on Marx-
ism-Leninism to a pragmatic, market-oriented approach.23  This shows that
one cannot possibly sever political determinants from the study of the
AML; they constitute the conditions of its very existence.
A. Law as an Incomplete Contract
If we view law as a contract— according to which a legislature specifies
the terms upon which business undertakings will be subject to regula-
tion— the contract is very incomplete.  There are contingencies that are
inevitably unforeseen by the law, and the law does not spell out the rules
and procedures to be followed in every conceivable circumstance in precise
detail.24  This is especially true for antitrust law, which is fundamentally
tasked with assessing the economic effects of the behaviours in question.
Black letter law is ill-suited for such a task as it runs the risk of making
20. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390 (1937) (herein-
after The Nature of the Firm).  According to Coase, his interest in the nature of the firm
stemmed from his observation of the communist system: “Lenin had said that the eco-
nomic system in Russia would be run as one big factory.  However, many economists in
the West maintained that this was an impossibility.  And yet there were factories in the
West and some of them were extremely large.  How could the views expressed by econo-
mists on the role of the pricing system and the impossibility of successful central eco-
nomic planning be reconciled with the existence of management and of these apparently
planned societies, that is, firms operating within our own economy?” See RONALD H.
COASE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 7 (1994).
21. See The Nature of the Firm, supra note 20, at 392.
22. See id. at 395.
23. See Montinola et al., supra note 18, at 52.
24. DIXIT, supra note 16, at 20; see also Chenggang Xu & Katharina Pistor, Law
Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regula-
tion, LSE STICERD RESEARCH PAPER NO. TE442, 4 (Dec. 2002), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1160987.
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antitrust law based on the form of conduct rather than on economic
effects.  The responsibility of assessing behaviour thus falls on the shoul-
ders of law enforcers, including administrative agencies and the judiciary,
both of which enjoy wide discretion in assessing economic effects.
Unlike the United States, Chinese antitrust enforcement relies prima-
rily on administrative enforcement rather than private litigation.25  In a
democratic society the utility of administrative agencies’ law enforcement
activity can be modelled as the expected public benefit gained from a suc-
cessful prosecution, discounted by the probability of successful prosecu-
tion.26  Here, discounting is required as the judiciary provides an effective
check on the arbitrariness of the agencies’ enforcement.27  But in a country
like China where judicial power is often usurped by political power, judi-
cial oversight is severely limited.  In the past three decades, China has
taken an unusual path by undergoing breathtaking economic transforma-
tion with little political reform.28  Despite remarkable market liberaliza-
tion, China remains a country ruled by a single party— the CCP.  The CCP
maintains supreme authority over every apparatus of the country, includ-
ing the military, legislature, executive, and judiciary.  Independent judi-
ciaries provide democratic countries with the ultimate safeguard on legal
interpretation and enforcement by government agencies.  In China, how-
ever, the CCP maintains residual control of the law; that is, the CCP makes
the final determination on how to interpret and enforce the law.29
B. The Lack of Judicial Oversight
Since the AML went into effect, no defendant has appealed any admin-
istrative decision made by the enforcement agencies.30  China’s Adminis-
trative Litigation Law of 1989, which allows citizens to bring lawsuits
against government agencies, proved to be a false hope for the establish-
ment of rule of law in China.31  Haibo He, a Tsinghua law professor who
25. Owen et al., supra note 5, at 124.
26. Richard A. Posner, The Behaviour of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305,
305 (1972).
27. See id. (“Discounting is required in order to reflect the fact that a case is less
worthwhile if . . . there is a smaller chance of the agency’s winning it.”).
28. See Montinola et al., supra note 18, at 52. Although China has achieved little
progress in democratization, it is noteworthy that it has made great strides in other
ways, including political decentralization, shifts in ideology, and the opening of its
economy.
29. See ZHENG YONGNIAN, THE  CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AS ORGANIZATIONAL
EMPEROR: CULTURE, REPRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION 113– 14 (2010).
30. Based on publicly available information, there has not been a case in which a
defendant appealed an administrative decision by Chinese antitrust agencies as of the
end of 2013.  This is confirmed by an interview with a judge at the Supreme People’s
Court (Jan. 3, 2014).
31. See, e.g., Susan Finder, Like Throwing An Egg against a Stone: Administrative Liti-
gation in the People’s Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1, 1 (1989); Kevin O’Brien & Li
Lianjiang, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, 51 CHINA J. 75,
75– 76 (2005); Pei Minxin, Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China, 152
CHINA Q. 832, 859 (1992) (concluding that China’s closed political system has severely
limited the efficacy of the Administrative Litigation Law for individual litigants).  For
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has closely followed the developments of Chinese administrative law over
the past decade, concluded that the institution of administrative litigation
fails to achieve constitutional governance in China and only impacts social
change on a severely limited level.32  Based on the national statistical data
produced by the Supreme People’s Court, he found a puzzling phenome-
non in Chinese administrative litigation: from 1987 to 2010 the rate of
plaintiff withdrawal never fell below 30%, and in some years it exceeded
50%.33  Among those withdrawn cases, over 50% of them (over 90% from
2005 to 2010) were initiated by plaintiffs without any action by the defend-
ants to revoke or modify the challenged administrative act.34  Thus the
plaintiff gained no benefits in those withdrawn cases.  For instance, in
2010, 44.5% of the cases accepted by Chinese administrative courts were
withdrawn, and among those cases, 92.8% were withdrawn by the plain-
tiffs without any action to revoke or modify by the defendants; the plain-
tiffs won the administrative suits in only 7.8% of those cases.35
Indeed, suing the government is both risky and costly for any business
in China, whether it is domestic or foreign owned.  At least three things
have been holding these businesses back.  First, businesses could face a
serious backlash when they deal with the enforcement agencies in the
future.  Since each of the enforcement agencies is nested within ministries
that operate like a large conglomerate, businesses fear retaliation not only
from those bureaus responsible for antitrust enforcement, but also from
other bureaus within these powerful ministries which have regulatory con-
trol over various aspects of their businesses.36  Moreover, the utility of
appealing administrative decisions is further undermined by the fact that
the likelihood of winning such a case is miniscule, given the predicament
of Chinese administrative litigation.  To make matters worse, enforcement
agencies such as NDRC often artificially create a race among firms under
investigation by applying generous leniency or complete immunity to those
who readily admit their guilt and satisfy the agency’s demands.  In a recent
case involving alleged minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) conduct
by premium infant formula milk manufacturers, NDRC offered 100%
immunity to Wyeth, Beingmate, and Meiji because they “cooperated with
the investigating authorities and actively rectified the issues once they
came to light,” whereas those firms deemed less cooperative suffered hefty
more recent works (available only in Chinese), see Qihui Huang, Xingzheng Susong
Yishen Shenpan Zhuangkuan Yanjiu [Research on Administrative Litigation at Courts of
First Instance], 7 TSINGHUA L. J. 73 (2013); Chunhua Zhu, Xingzheng Susong Ershen
Shenpan Zhuangkuan Yanjiu [Research on the Administrative Litigation at Courts of Sec-
ond Instance], 7 TSINGHUA L. J. 86 (2013).
32. He Haibo, Litigation Without A Ruling: The Predicament of Administrative Law in
China, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 257, 258 (2011).
33. Id. at 261– 63.
34. Id. at 263– 64.
35. Id. at 263.
36. Interviews with Chinese antitrust lawyers (Dec. 7 & 8, 2014). See also Lester
Ross & Kenneth Zhou, Administrative and Civil Litigation under the Anti-Monopoly Law,
in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 5, at 317, 322– 26.
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fines.37  Such grants of immunity are very unusual in other jurisdictions;
immunity is normally only granted to firms that volunteer to help antitrust
authorities uncover secret cartels.  However, NDRC was investigating RPM
conduct and none of the affected manufacturers were whistleblowers.38
This peculiar fining practice can therefore lead to a prisoner’s dilemma for
firms under investigation.  If each firm anticipates that other firms will
race to admit their guilt in order to receive a lower fine, then none of them
will have the incentive to challenge the government’s action.  The high risks
and costs at stake thus explain the reluctance of businesses to appeal an
administrative antitrust decision.
At the same time, the Chinese judiciary has been actively engaged in
drafting guidelines for private enforcement39 and has handled more than
100 civil antitrust actions since the enactment of the AML.40  While plain-
tiffs rarely succeed in private enforcement,41 Chinese judges have been
praised for being more adept with economic reasoning and analysis.42
Unfortunately, it appears that their enthusiasm and dedication are limited
to civil cases.  While the Supreme People’s Court has designated the Intel-
lectual Property Tribunals to handle civil cases,43 the Court has not issued
guidelines on the judicial review of administrative cases.  Generally speak-
ing, judges at the Administrative Tribunal are in charge of hearing adminis-
trative cases.44  However, because antitrust enforcement is often highly
technical and requires substantial economic analysis, there are doubts
37. He Sheng Yuan Deng Naifen Shengchan Qiye Weifan Fan Longduan Fa Xianzhi
Jingzheng Xingwei Gong Bei Chufa 6.6873 Yi Yuan [Biostime and Other Milk Powder Manu-
facturers Company Were Fined RMB668.73 Million for Their Anti-Competitive Behaviour
Violating the AML], NDRC PRESS RELEASE (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/
xwfb/201308/t20130807_552991.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Milk
Powder Decision].
38. See id.
39. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the
Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Con-
duct (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 30, 2012, effective June 1, 2012)
(Lawinfochina) (China).
40. Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Five Years of Implementation of China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law— Achievements and Challenges, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 247, 263
(2013).
41. Id. at 264 (noting only two cases in which plaintiffs have won).
42. See David S. Evans et al., Analyzing Competition Among Internet Players: Qihoo
360 v. Tencent, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, (May 2013).  But in some early cases, judges
were criticized for their lack of understanding of economics. See, e.g., Angela Huyue
Zhang, Using A Sledgehammer to Crack A Nut: Why China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Was Inap-
propriate for Renren v. Baidu, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 277, 294 (2011).
43. See Zui Gao Fayuan Guanyu Xuexi He Guance Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo
Fang Longduan Fa De Tongzhi [Notice by the Supreme People’s Court on In-depth Stud-
ying and Implementing the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, July 28,2008), available at http://
zzzy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=582 .
44. Telephone interview with a judge at the Intermediate People’s Court (Jan. 17,
2014).  According to the interviewee, in normal circumstances the Administrative Tribu-
nal handles administrative cases.  However, in some remote places where the Adminis-
trative Tribunal has not been established, the Civil Tribunal can handle administrative
cases.
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about whether judges at the Administrative Tribunal are equipped with suf-
ficient expertise to handle antitrust cases.45
Given the predicament of administrative litigation in China, adminis-
trative agencies have effectively monopolized public enforcement in China.
When law enforcement essentially becomes a political process, the study of
bureaucratic structure, the political process of decision-making, and the
incentives of the government actors involved all become essential to under-
standing the enforcement outcome of the AML.
II. Bureaucratic Structure and Policy Process
Although the CCP maintains supreme control of all strategic poli-
cymaking in China, it cannot administer the country on its own.  Rather, it
needs to delegate this task to the government.46  While the CCP has perme-
ated every level of the Chinese government, the CCP and the government
are organizationally distinct.47  In particular, the Politburo, which sits at
the apex of the CCP political hierarchy, lacks the time, interest, and exper-
tise to manage and coordinate all economic affairs in China— not to men-
tion antitrust policy and implementation.48  Therefore, the Politburo
delegates the implementation of the AML to the State Council, which in
turn delegates these tasks to various ministries.  Specifically, the primary
enforcement responsibilities of the AML are split among three administra-
tive agencies: MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC.  Specifically, MOFCOM is pri-
marily responsible for merger control, a pre-emptive form of antitrust
intervention; NDRC and SAIC are responsible for ex post antitrust enforce-
ment.  Inevitably, as authority to enforce the AML has been delegated to
specific enforcement agencies, much of the critical activity in the shaping
and implementation of the antitrust policies takes place at the bureaucratic
level.  To begin, I will examine MOFCOM’s enforcement action since it is
the most active player among the three enforcement agencies and is often
viewed as being at the forefront in formulating Chinese antitrust policy.
45. Telephone interview with a judge at the Supreme People’s Court (Jan. 3, 2014).
According to the interviewee, it hasn’t been decided whether the judges in the Intellec-
tual Property Tribunal (one of the Civil Tribunals at the Intermediate Court) or the
Administrative Tribunal will handle administrative cases.
46. Political scientists have long observed a principal-agent relationship between the
CCP and the government. See, e.g., Susan Shirk, The Chinese Political System and the
Political Strategy of Economic Reform, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN
POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 17, at 59, 61– 62 (Shirk notes that the relationship between
the CCP and the government is analogous to the relationship between the ruling party
and the government bureaucracy in a democratic system; however, the crucial difference
between communist and democratic systems is the political accountability of
principals).
47. Shirk, supra note 46, at 55.
48. Telephone interviews with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 8,
2014).  This is consistent with an observation made by Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese
leadership. See Cheng Li, China’s Economic Decisionmakers, CHINA BUSINESS REV, 21
(March/Apr., 2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
articles/2008/3/03%20china%20li/03_china_li.pdf (stating that five members of the
Politburo standing committee focus on non-economic issues such as institutional and
legal development).
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Similar to most jurisdictions in the world, merger review is mandatory
and suspensory in China.  As long as a transaction meets the notification
thresholds in China, parties to the transaction have the obligation to notify
MOFCOM; the deal cannot be closed until MOFCOM clears the transac-
tion.49  Chinese merger notification thresholds are based on the sales reve-
nue of the transacting parties.50  These thresholds, however, are poor
proxies of the competitive effects of a transaction as the sales revenue of
transacting parties says little about the impact of their transaction on the
Chinese market.  Not surprisingly, since the AML went into effect,
MOFCOM has spent most of its efforts reviewing offshore merger transac-
tions between large multinational companies; very often those transactions
have little nexus with the Chinese market.51
It should be noted China is hardly the only jurisdiction that has been
beset with this problem.  The Chinese merger review system is modelled
after that of the European Union (EU), which has a body of competition
law that is followed by many jurisdictions all over the world.  But there are
two features that have made the Chinese jurisdiction stand apart from all
others.  First, the merger notification process in China is notoriously pro-
tracted.  Large multinational companies increasingly find that their merger
transactions are held up by MOFCOM’s clearance decisions. For instance,
in Google/Motorola, China was the last jurisdiction to clear the transac-
tion.52  In fact, MOFCOM did not clear the transaction until the last day of
the statutory review period.53  In some cases where merging parties had
not reached a desirable outcome with MOFCOM, the agency required or
encouraged the parties to withdraw their filings and re-file.54  Thus, in
some cases, MOFCOM’s review time significantly exceeds the statutory
49. Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds for Prior Notification of Concen-
trations of Undertakings (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 1, 2008, effective Aug.
1, 2008) (China).
50. Id.
51. During the first five years of its enforcement, MOFCOM has reviewed a total of
643 cases.  It blocked one transaction and imposed remedies on twenty mergers.  The
vast majority of the twenty conditional approval cases involve foreign-to-foreign transac-
tions.  For those transactions that have been unconditionally cleared, there is little pub-
lic disclosure except for the names of the transacting parties of those cases.  An initial
analysis of those cases shows that almost half of the unconditional clearance cases
involve foreign-to-foreign transactions. See MOFCOM’s published decisions, available at:
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/; see also MOFCOM Press Release, MOFCOM
Achieved Significant Positive Developments with Antitrust Enforcement, MOFCOM PRESS
RELEASE (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201308/2013080022
6124.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2014); Fei Deng & Cunzhen Huang, A Five Year Review
of Merger Enforcement in China, 13 THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 5– 7 (2013).
52. See Google Wins Chinese Approval for Motorola Bid, BBC NEWS BUSINESS (May 21,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-18140940.
53. No. 25 of 2012 Announcement Regarding the Conditional Approval of the Anti-
Monopoly Review of Google’s Acquisition of Motorola, MOFCOM (May 19, 2012), http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201205/20120508134324.shtml (last visited Nov. 3,
2014).
54. Deng & Huang, supra note 51, at 5.
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review period.55  Additionally, it has been observed that, unlike other large
merger jurisdictions— particularly the United States and the EU— where
merger review is nowadays primarily economics-based, MOFCOM often
incorporates non-competition factors (particularly industrial policies) into
its analyses.56  As such, there is often suspicion among the international
business community that MOFCOM applies the AML to protect domestic
industries from foreign competition.57
To be fair, MOFCOM is understaffed compared to other merger review
antitrust agencies in large jurisdictions; the Anti-Monopoly Bureau, respon-
sible for reviewing hundreds of cases each year, is staffed with only 35
people.58  This fact alone, however, does not fully account for the delays.  It
is widely known among experienced practitioners that MOFCOM regularly
confers with other government departments and organizations during
merger review, particularly with bureaus at NDRC and the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) that are in charge of indus-
trial policies, as well as local governments in certain cases.59  The consult-
ing process is rather opaque and MOFCOM does not discuss the
information it obtains from these government agencies with the disputing
parties.60  In fact, the more government departments are involved in the
consulting process, the more unpredictable it becomes; sometimes the
delays are not within MOFCOM’s control.61  Moreover, because
MOFCOM’s final decisions are influenced by opinions and comments from
other government agencies such as NDRC and MIIT, their decisions some-
times appear inconsistent with economic-based principles and interna-
tional standards.62
But if our inquiry were to stop here, it would neglect the more interest-
ing and important questions: Why does MOFCOM need to confer with
other government agencies?  Isn’t it in the interest of MOFCOM to consoli-
date its enforcement power and to make all merger decisions on its own?
To understand MOFCOM’s rather unusual practice of consulting other gov-
ernment agencies, we need to delve deeper into the Chinese bureaucratic
structure and political decision-making process.
55. Id. (This phenomenon has been observed in a number of conditional approval
cases including Western Digital/Hitachi, Glencore/Xstrata, Marubeni/Gavilon, and
MediaTeck/MStar).
56. D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 10 N.Y.U. J.L.
& BUS. 1, 14– 16 (2013)
57. Mario Mariniello, The Dragon Awakes: Is Chinese Competition Policy A Cause for




58. Huang & Li, supra note 14, at 9.
59. Id. at 20.
60. Deng & Huang, supra note 51, at 10.
61. Telephone interviews with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 7,
2014).
62. Id.
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A. Management by Exception
China is a vast country.  On the official organizational chart (see Fig-
ure 1 below), the Chinese bureaucracy is divided into a central government
and local governments.  The central government consists of the State Coun-
cil and various ministries and organizations.  The local government con-
sists of four levels, including 31 provincial-level units (including 22
provinces, 4 municipalities and 5 autonomous regions), 332 cities, 2,853
counties and 40,466 townships.63  The management of such a huge
bureaucracy is not an easy task.
Figure 1: Official Organization of Chinese Bureaucracy
Local Governments 
Central Government 




State Council & Ministries 
Using a principal-agent model, Huang examines Chinese bureaucratic
structure by dividing it into two levels.64  (See Figure 2 below). The first
level, the “control level,” consists of the Politburo and the State Council,
which sit at the top of China’s political hierarchy.65  The Politburo is the
supreme decision-making body for all major strategic matters in the coun-
try; the State Council is responsible for transforming the Politburo’s strate-
gic decisions into concrete policies.66  The second level, the “controlled
level,” is comprised of ministerial and provincial agencies.67
63. Zhonghua Renming Gong He Guo Xingzheng Quhua Tongji Biao [The Statistics of
Administrative Divisions] (as of Dec. 31, 2011), MINISTRY OF CIV. AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://qhs.mca.gov.cn/article/zlzx/qhtj/201203/20120300282479
.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2014) (Note that Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau are not
included as provincial units in Figure 1).
64. See Yasheng Huang, Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics
Perspective, 50 POLITICAL STUDIES 61, 66– 67 (2002).
65. Id. at 66.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 66– 67.
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The logic behind such division is two-fold: first, the agencies at the
control level appoint the leaders of the agencies that make up the con-
trolled level; second, the divergence of preferences is sharpest between
these two levels.69  Each of the ministries has well-defined functions and
each of the provinces has its own territorial interest;70 thus, they often pur-
sue their own interests at the expense of the interest of the whole system.71
Moreover, each of the ministries and provinces has relative autonomy in
managing its own affairs, including the control of its own personnel.72
Since 1984, the CCP has applied the one-rank-down nomenklatura system,
thus allowing the control level to appoint only the top level officials at the
controlled level— ministers and provincial heads.73  Therefore, the appoint-
ments to all but the top-level positions are controlled from within the con-
trolled level.74
This principal-agent perspective not only elucidates the logic behind
the highly complex institutional design of China’s bureaucracy, but also
illuminates the nation’s political process of decision-making.75  When the
agent acquires specialized information and develops an informational
advantage over the principal, the agent can vary the quality and quantity of
68. Id. at 68.
69. Id. at 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 67– 68.
73. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM
235– 37 (2004).
74. Id. at 236– 37.
75. See id. at 233– 39 (discussing the political process of decision-making and how
this framework can be fit into a principal agent context); see also LIEBERTHAL &
OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 30.
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its efforts, particularly those that are unobservable by the principal.76
Therefore, agency problems can arise when the control level (the Politburo
and the State Council) delegates authority to the controlled level (the min-
istries and provincial governments).  So how does the former induce the
latter to reveal its information?
Political scientists have long observed that the Chinese government
bureaucracy makes economic policy according to the decision rule of
“management by exception”;77 at each bureaucratic level, agency represent-
atives make decisions by a rule of consensus.78  If the representatives at
one level all agree, the decision is automatically ratified at the higher
level.79  Otherwise, the decision will be referred to authorities at a higher
level who will either step in to make the decision, or allow the matter to be
dropped until consensus can be reached.80
This method of decision-making has been applied to alleviate the prob-
lem of information asymmetry for the CCP leadership.  To begin, Chinese
ministries are organized either by function (e.g., education, culture,
finance) or by economic sector (e.g., agriculture, telecommunication, trans-
portation).81  This complex structure gives virtual (i.e. nonelectoral) repre-
sentation to the economic groups and interests that the CCP leadership
depends on for political support.82  This structure also provides some
checks and balances among the agencies; each of the agencies has a partic-
ular mission and is expected to pursue it with zeal.83  Therefore, when min-
istries and provincial leaders are called together to discuss a policy
proposal, they are expected to represent and articulate the views of their
units.84  Accordingly, delegation by consensus is deemed more efficient
because it relieves the top CCP leadership of the trouble of constant inter-
vention in the policy process.85  When consensus cannot be reached, the
issue will be pushed to the top so that the superior can exploit the informa-
tion advantage it obtains through different subordinate agencies.86
One direct consequence of “management by exception” is that power
becomes fragmented when it comes to policymaking and implementa-
tion.87 The existence of massive, parallel, and interdependent bureaucra-
76. DIXIT, supra note 16, at 86– 88.
77. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 116 n. 1 (noting that “delegation by consensus” is “iden-
tical to what management specialists call ‘management by exception’”); see also LIEBER-
THAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 23– 24 (discussing how consensus building is
integral to political process in the Chinese system of government).
78. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 116– 17.
79. Id. at 116.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 93.
82. Id. at 99.
83. LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 29.
84. Id. See also SHIRK, supra note 17, at 98– 99.
85. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 117.
86. See id. at 116– 17.
87. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 22; see also Kenneth Lieberthal,
Introduction: The “Fragmented Authoritarianism” Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAU-
CRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION-MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 17, at 9, 12.
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cies and territorial administrations with overlapping jurisdictions further
complicates this process.  Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, two
leading experts on Chinese politics, propose a “fragmented authoritarian-
ism” model to examine the political processes in China.88  By closely stud-
ying Chinese economic policymaking, they found that policy made at the
center is increasingly malleable to the political interests of the various min-
istries and provinces charged with enforcing that policy within their juris-
dictions.89  Within the energy sector, for instance, they found that a single
ministry or province usually lacks sufficient clout to launch or sustain a
big project or major new policy.90  Such fragmentation of authority thus
demands elaborate efforts of consensus building at each stage of the deci-
sion-making process.91
David Lampton’s studies on bargaining in Chinese politics shed simi-
lar light in this respect.92  He finds that bargaining among bureaucracies
with similar political resources and bureaucratic ranks is so frequent and
ubiquitous that policymaking becomes protracted and inefficient.93  As he
notes: “Americans sometimes see themselves as uniquely hamstrung by a
‘checks and balances system’, the Chinese decision system often is ham-
strung by a complex bargaining process and the need to build a consen-
sus.”94  Susan Shirk also observes that because each participant at the
bargaining table has veto power, policies that emerge from this system tend
to be incremental rather than radical.95  Moreover, if there are more partici-
pants involved in the decision-making process, policy consensus becomes
more elusive.96
B. Consensus Building in Merger Enforcement
Due to the lack of judicial oversight, the Chinese government has
effectively monopolized the whole antitrust enforcement process; this turns
antitrust enforcement into a political process involving a large number of
government actors, as reflected in the personnel composition of the Anti-
Monopoly Commission (AMC).  In 2008, the State Council established the
AMC as a consulting and coordinating organization which was responsible
for orchestrating the activities of the three enforcement agencies.97  The
AMC was first headed by Qishan Wang, the then-vice premier in charge of
88. See generally LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 22– 31.  For more recent
works on fragmented authoritarianism, see Mertha, supra note 17, at 995– 96.
89. Mertha, supra note 17, at 996.
90. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 23.
91. Id. at 22– 23.
92. See David M. Lampton, A Plum for a Peach: Bargaining, Interest and Bureaucratic
Politics in China, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION-MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA,
supra note 17, at 33, 34– 35.
93. Id. at 34– 35, 57.
94. Id. at 35.
95. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 127.
96. See id. (“The larger and less stable the set of participants, the more elusive is
policy consensus.”).
97. The AML, supra note 1, art. 9.
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the economic bureaucratic system.98  The heads of NDRC, SAIC, and
MOFCOM, as well as a deputy secretary-general of the State Council, serve
as deputy directors.99  The AMC also consists of fourteen commissioners,
including the incumbent deputy heads of various ministries and institu-
tions under the State Council.100  As a consulting and coordinating organi-
zation, the AMC does not undertake any specific enforcement activity;
rather, it operates only through meetings.101  In practice, the commission-
ers rarely hold formal meetings to discuss antitrust issues,102 and the day-
to-day work is assigned to MOFCOM.103  Despite the inactivity of the AMC,
it has officially bestowed authority upon various ministries and organiza-
tions to engage in antitrust affairs.  Its structure of authority implies that
no single ministry has the clout to unilaterally make an important antitrust
policy or decision.  Rather, it will have to obtain the active cooperation of
other bureaucratic units who are themselves nested in distinct chains of
authority.  The composition of the AMC therefore suggests that enforce-
ment of the AML is in effect a consensus-building process within the Chi-
nese bureaucracy— similar to economic policy- and decision-making in
China.
MOFCOM’s consulting practice provides a good opportunity for us to
investigate the decision-making process.  Based on our interviews with gov-
ernment officials working at central ministries, we find that government
officials do not view MOFCOM’s consulting practice as “unusual” at all— in
fact, they believe this is the standard procedure for economic policy and for
decision-making in central ministries.104  They note that within the Chi-
nese government bureaucracy, it is a customary practice for one agency in
charge of economic policy or decision-making to solicit comments and
opinions from other government agencies, widely known as the “huiqian”
98. Notice of the General Office of the State Council on the Main Functions and
Members of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council (promulgated by the
General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, July 28, 2008)
(LawinfoChina), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7190&CGid
(last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
99. Id.
100. See id. These include: NDRC, SAIC, MOFCOM, State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Supervision, the
State Intellectual Property Office, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China
Security Regulatory Commission, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission, the
State Electricity Regulatory Commission and the Legislative Affairs Office of the State
Council.
101. See Regulations on Administration of the Establishment and Staffing of the
Administrative Agencies of the State Council art. 6 (promulgated by Decree No. 227 of
the State Council, Aug. 3, 1997, effective Aug. 3. 1997) 4 P.R.C. LAWS & REGS III-01-01-
201 (China).
102. See Hao, supra note 14, at 23 (“[E]xcept  for its issuance of the Guidelines on the
Definition of the Relevant Market in 2009, the AMC itself has remained mostly invisible
to the public.”).
103. The AMC has set up a secretariat office within MOFCOM.
104. Telephone interviews with government officials at central ministries (Jan. 7– 8,
2014).
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(meaning “countersign”) procedure in China.105  The huiqian procedure
has long been practiced among ministerial agencies, despite the absence of
formal rules or procedures.106  Moreover, the State Council Working Proce-
dure Rules explicitly state that the decision-making process used by each
ministry and organization underneath the State Council must be demo-
cratic and scientific.107  In addition, the State Council Working Procedure
Rules specify that, if the State Council needs to be notified of important
matters, it will require prior extensive research and consulting, including
sufficient cooperation with other relevant government departments.108  In
practice, government agencies that have been consulted will have a say in
the policymaking process and thus the “huiqian” procedure is an impor-
tant consensus-building mechanism among various government actors.109
Consistent with prior studies conducted by political scientists on delega-
tion by consensus, interviewees confirm that policy proposals or adminis-
trative decisions that have been through the “huiqian” procedure will
normally be ratified by the State Council.110  On the other hand, if the
agencies are unable to reach a consensus on a matter, the decision will be
pushed up to the State Council.111
Because large merger transactions often have an impact on the compet-
itive structure of domestic industries, a merger review will inevitably
involve the functions of other government departments, such as those
responsible for industrial policy or those in charge of overseeing certain
economic industry sectors.  Accordingly, even if the “huiqian” procedure
constrains MOFCOM’s discretion to some extent, it also mitigates the risk
that a decision will negatively impact the interests of the other government
agencies at play.  The “huiqian” procedure also helps MOFCOM gain
insight into the industry sectors in which the mergers take place.  With
limited experience in merger review, the staff at MOFCOM has neither the
capacity nor the sufficient expertise on various industry sectors to conduct
merger review.112  As MOFCOM cannot solely rely on information pro-
vided by the merging parties, the “huiqian” procedure thus becomes part
of an important market investigation process.  In fact, if MOFCOM makes
an important merger decision without properly consulting relevant govern-
ment departments, the legitimacy of its decision could be challenged inter-
nally within the government bureaucracy.113
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Guowuyuan Gongzuo Guize [The State Council Working Procedure Rules] arts.
21– 25, (promulgated by the State Council, March 23, 2013) http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/
2013-03/28/content_2364572.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
108. Id. at art. 23.




112. Telephone interview with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 7,
2014).
113. Id.
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Since the delegation by consensus mechanism maintains some checks
and balances among different government agencies, can it nonetheless
serve as a close substitute for the democratic system of decision-making
and thus produce outcomes that will maximize national interest?  The
answer is probably not.  As each government agency is carefully evaluating
the costs and benefits of proposed decisions in terms of its own interest,
they are unlikely to reach a consensus unless the decision is a Pareto
improvement (i.e. it benefits at least one party and harms no one).  Other-
wise, the agency that has its self-interests harmed will fight fiercely against
the decision.  This is not necessarily the optimal outcome for the nation as
a whole; to maximize national interest, the self-interests of some govern-
ment actors may need to be sacrificed when the overall social benefits over-
weigh the costs.
Although MOFCOM has an interest in consulting other government
departments, it does not necessarily incorporate all of their opinions. As
each government agency is presumed to represent its own particular inter-
ests, there are often conflicts among various agencies. When conflict
arises, it is then left to a “bargaining” process in which MOFCOM and
other government agencies hammer out a workable solution that is deemed
satisfactory to everyone.114  Therefore, in many circumstances compromise
is a necessity because it is usually not possible to please everyone.  In fact,
while some government agencies have complained that MOFCOM has “del-
egated” too much work to the agencies by consulting them too frequently,
they have also complained that the opinions they provided during consul-
tation have not all been adopted by MOFCOM.115  However, because the
“huiqian” procedure is a repeated game, an agency that refuses to compro-
mise with other agencies faces potential retaliation when it wants to pro-
pose a decision or policy the next time.116  Therefore, anticipating that
they will need MOFCOM’s cooperation in the future, government agencies
tend to seek compromise with MOFCOM.117  As to how much other agen-
cies voice their opinions, how hard these agencies press their opinions, and
how much MOFCOM ultimately incorporates their opinions into a final
decision depend on the relative power of the factional networks which
those government agencies represent vis-a-vis MOFCOM.118
III. The Motives and Behavior of Central Enforcement Agencies
Within the realm of antitrust enforcement, NDRC is primarily respon-
sible for price-related anti-competitive behaviour and SAIC is primarily






119. See Main Functions of the NDRC, NDRC, en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/ (last visited
Sept. 13, 2014); see also Mission, SAIC, www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/
index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
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SAIC have about 15 and 8 people, respectively, in Beijing who are responsi-
ble for antitrust enforcement.120  While staff capacity at the central minis-
tries is low, these agencies have thousands of staff members at the local
level who have authority to enforce the AML.121  In the first three years of
the AML’s enforcement, both agencies seemed engaged in capacity build-
ing and drafting implementing guidelines.  The few cases that they have
disclosed were initiated by local bureaus involving small domestic private
companies, where the amount of the fine was so small that it hardly
attracted any attention from the public or legal community.122  As the pub-
lic had high hopes that the AML would be applied to tackle the monopolis-
tic behaviour of Chinese SOEs, complaints began to mount that the
Chinese AML was only catching the flies but not the tigers.123
On November 9, 2011, NDRC announced on Chinese television that it
had been investigating two large telecommunication firms— China Telecom
and China Unicom— for allegedly conducting price discrimination against
rival companies.124  This was the first antitrust investigation of Chinese
SOEs and marked a turning point in Chinese antitrust enforcement.  Since
then, Chinese antitrust enforcement has seemingly taken a great leap for-
ward.  So far, NDRC has investigated a number of high profile cases and
has imposed remedies and hefty fines on a variety of influential economic
actors.  These include private domestic pharmaceutical companies;125
large multinational companies, including manufacturers of LCD panels126
and milk powder companies;127 SOEs owned by local governments,
120. Telephone interviews with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 6,
2014).
121. Id. Notably, NDRC added 150 staff members to the local enforcement units in
2011.
122. The decisions disclosed by NDRC are available on its website: http://jjs.ndrc
.gov.cn; the decisions disclosed by SAIC are available on its website: http://www.saic
.gov.cn/zwgk/gggs/jzzf/ [hereinafter SAIC’s decisions].
123. Jiadi Lao, Fan Jiage Longduan Guiding Bei Zhi Da Cangying Bu Da Laohu [The
Anti-Price Monopoly Provision Had Been Alleged to Only Catch the Flies but Not the Tigers],
XINGWEN WANBAO [EVENING NEWS], (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.antimonopolylaw.org/
article/default.asp?id=2623 (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
124. Loretta Chao, China Telecom, China Unicom Face Monopoly Probe, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020435800457
7027283900972206 .
125. Liang Yiyao Gongsi Longduan Fufang Li Xue Ping Yuanliao Yao Shoudao Yanli
Chufa [Two Pharmaceutical Companies Have Been Severely Punished for Monopoly of the
Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients of Compound Reserpine], NDRC PRESS RELEASE (Nov. 15,
2011), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201402/t20140228_588588.html
(last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
126. Liu Jia Jingwai Qiye Shishi Yejing Mianbang Jiage Longduan Bei Yifa Chachu [Six
Overseas Companies Investigated and Punished Legally for LCD Panel Price Monopoly],
NDRC PRESS RELEASE (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/jjszhdt/
201301/t20130117_523206.html. (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
127. See Milk Powder Decision, supra note 37.  Contrary to most media reports, not
all the milk powder companies investigated are foreign companies.  In fact, Biostime Inc.
(Guangzhou), the company that received the largest fine, is a Chinese company. See
Matters in relation to the Administrative Punishment Decision Received by a Subsidiary of
the Group And Resumption of Trading, BAOSTIME INT’L HOLDING LTD. (Aug. 7, 2013), http:/
/www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2013/0807/LTN20130807015.pdf.
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including the premium white liquor companies Maotai and Wuliangye;128
and gold retailers in Shanghai.129  Very recently, NDRC has also begun to
investigate American technology firms such as Qualcomm and InterDig-
ital.130 These investigations have attracted heightened attention, as both
companies rely heavily on the Chinese market to license standard-essential
patents (SEPs) to domestic firms, and because these investigations appear
to have been initiated by complaints from domestic firms.131
When compared to the actions of NDRC, the actions of SAIC seem to
be more cautious and conservative.  As of October 31, 2014, SAIC has pub-
licly disclosed only sixteen cases on its website, all of which were investi-
gated by local offices and involved small, local companies and insignificant
fines and remedies.132  It wasn’t until 2013 that SAIC announced that it
had launched an investigation against Tetra Pak, a large Swedish packing
firm, for conducting tying activity in China.133  The antitrust bureau at
NDRC in Beijing has a larger staff than its counterpart at SAIC, but this fact
alone seems insufficient to account for the divergent patterns of enforce-
ment.  Since the responsibility for antitrust enforcement is split between
NDRC and SAIC, both agencies have an interest in competing against each
other for antitrust policy control.134  But why does NDRC appear more
aggressive than SAIC in bringing antitrust cases?  What has motivated
NDRC to bring those cases?  More fundamentally, why did NDRC and
SAIC divide their responsibilities based on whether a behaviour is price-
128. Decision in Wuliangye Case, SICHUAN DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM COMMISSION
(DRC) PRESS RELEASE (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.scdrc.gov.cn/dir25/159074.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Wuliangye Decision]; Decision in Maotai Case,
GUIZHOU PRICE BUREAU PRICE RELEASE (Feb. 22, 2013), http://money.163.com/13/0222/
16/8OB59OO800252G50.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Maotai Decision].
129. Shanghai Huangjing Shiping Hangye Xiehui Ji Bufen Jing Dian Shishi Jiage
Longduan Xingwei Bei Yifa Chachu [Shanghai Golden Jewelry Association and A Number of
Gold Retailers Were Fined for Implementing Price Monopoly], NDRC PRESS RELEASE (Aug.
3, 2014), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/jjszhdt/201308/t20130813_553443
.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Gold Retailer Decision].  All five gold retail-
ers investigated by NDRC were initially controlled by the State Asset Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) of Huangpu District in Shanghai.  In 2002, the
majority control of two gold retailers, Lao Miao Huang Jing and Ya Yi Huang Jing, was
transferred to Fosun, a large private domestic firm.  But Shanghai SASAC maintains
majority control of the other three gold retailers, including Lao Feng Xiang, Cheng
Huang Zhu Bao, and Tian Bao Long Feng.  One may be puzzled by the fact that the
Shanghai government still retains control in competitive businesses like gold retailing;
however, this is perfectly consistent with Yasheng Huang’s acute observation of state-led
capitalism in Shanghai. See generally YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARAC-
TERISTICS: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE STATE 175– 232(2008).
130. See InterDigital Executives Fear Arrest, Won’t Meet Chinese Antitrust Agency,
REUTERS, (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/16/us-interdigital-
china-idUSBRE9BF0CW20131216 (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Interdigital
News].
131. See id.
132. SAIC’s decisions, supra note 122.
133. Kathrin Hille, China’s Watchdog Shows They Have Teeth, FINANCIAL TIMES, (July 5,
2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2310d35e-e56c-11e2-ad1a-00144feabdc0.html#axz
z2rKpL2M91 (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
134. Zhang, supra note 14, at 640– 45.
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related?  The answers to these questions lie in the incentive structure for
government officials working at central ministries.
A. The Utility Function of Central Technocrats
Political scientists have long observed that power fragmentation in
policy-making leads to an endless struggle for policy control among vari-
ous levels of Chinese government agencies.135  This is because administra-
tive intervention in the market creates valuable resources for Chinese
government officials, who can then appropriate those resources in the
form of bribes (corruption) or political support (patronage).136  Such
opportunities for patronage therefore create fertile soil for factions to be
formed.  Although factions are officially prohibited within the CCP and
can be organized only in secret, abundant literature on Chinese politics
identifies intraparty factions as the key to understanding political power in
China.137
Due to the lack of an institutionalized mechanism for succession and
of clear indicators of power, Chinese leaders face constant threats to their
power.138  In order to gain support, these leaders form factions in which a
loose group of lower officials have an incentive to support senior officials
in any potential challenges.139  Senior officials acquire their factions as
they cultivate professional relationships with junior colleagues during the
course of their careers.140  In return for their support, senior officials
reward lower officials with security or advancement.141  Over time, these
loose networks of mutual obligation and exchange become conduits
through which appointments, economic goods, and policy power are chan-
nelled.142  As Lucian Pye elucidated: The prime basis for factions among
cadres is the search for career security and the protection of power.143
In China, all factions are formed with a single ultimate goal—
power.144  However, not all factions are created in the same fashion, and
each is endowed with different resources and memberships.145  Govern-
ment officials working at central ministries are often called central techno-
135. See generally LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6 at 22– 31; see also Lampton,
supra note 92, at 57 (discussing how decisions are also made very slowly, and each level
of the government focuses on tailoring the decision to fit its own interest).
136. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 142.
137. See, e.g., Andrew Nathan, A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, 1973 CHINA Q.
34, 35 (1973); LUCIAN PYE, THE DYNAMICS OF FACTIONS AND CONSENSUS IN CHINESE POLIT-
ICS: A MODEL AND SOME PROPOSITIONS 6– 8 (1981); JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE
COMMUNIST POLITICS 412 (2000).  For more recent works, see Cheng Li, One Party, Two
Coalitions: Chinese Bipartisanship in the Making, Paper Presented at the Conference on
“Chinese Leadership, Politics, and Policy” (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://carnegieen
dowment.org/files/li.pdf and SHIH, supra note 17, at 3– 4.
138. See SHIH, supra note 17, at 4.
139. Id.
140. Id.  See also Nathan, supra note 137, at 43.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See PYE, supra note 137, at 6.
144. HUANG, supra note 137, at 412.
145. SHIH, supra note 17, at 4.
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crats.146  Compared with generalists such as governors at the provincial
government levels, who are in charge of a wide range of matters, central
technocrats have narrower experience in the regime and their expertise is
highly specialized.147  Generally speaking, central technocrats have a clear
preference toward central control as it grants them more policy discre-
tion.148  Most central technocrats spend their whole career within the same
organization and rise vertically within it, absorbing and serving its particu-
lar ideology;149 their career paths thus affect their incentive structures and
political preferences.150  For those forward-looking central technocrats,
their main utility function is to maximize their power through promoting
members of their factions and enlarging the resources available to agencies
controlled by faction members.151  As Victor Shih, who closely studies the
politics of Chinese monetary policy, stated, the more control an agency has
over an important policy area, the more likely it will be that that agency
can capitalize on such power to accumulate administrative merits
(“zhengji”), thus paving the way for the faction leaders to rise to the top
level of the CCP hierarchy.152
The above study on power fragmentation and factional politics illumi-
nates the incentive structures of the three central antitrust enforcement
agencies.  While each of the three agencies clearly has an interest in com-
peting for antitrust policy control, antitrust is not their main competitive
arena.  As each of them is nested within ministries that operate like large
conglomerates, they all have divergent responsibilities and missions.  In
particular, NDRC is an agency mainly in charge of macroeconomic man-
agement and industrial planning, as elaborated upon in detail below.153
MOFCOM is primarily responsible for formulating and implementing both
inbound and outbound policies of trade and investment.154  It played a key
role in representing China in trade deal negotiations with foreign coun-
tries— the accession into the WTO is deemed one of its crowning achieve-
ments.  Not surprisingly, MOFCOM is generally seen as more liberal and
pro-market than other agencies, such as NDRC, with respect to economic
affairs.155  As one MOFCOM official says: “If we don’t advocate for free
146. See id. at 5.
147. Id. at 9– 10.
148. Id. at 5.
149. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 100.
150. See SHIH, supra note 17, at 4– 5.
151. Id. at 5.
152. See id. at 54.
153. See Main Functions of NDRC, NDRC, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/ (last visited
Sep. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Main Functions of NDRC].
154. Missions of MOFCOM, MOFCOM, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mis
sion2010.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2014).
155. For instance, Hucheng Gao, MOFCOM’s incumbent minister, recently published
an enthusiastic piece in China Daily advocating for open markets. See Hucheng Gao,
Zhongguo Yue Fazhan Jiu Yue Kaifang [China Becomes More Open As It Develops], CHINA
DAILY (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201312/201312004183
51.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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markets, how could we promote trade— which is our main business?”156
Compared with MOFCOM and NDRC, SAIC is smaller in size and has a
narrower mandate, with tasks including the administration of enterprise
registration, the regulation of unfair competition behaviour, and consumer
protection.157  As each of these three agencies had the incentive to maxi-
mize its own bureaucratic interests, their divergent missions shaped their
enforcement agendas during the implementation of the AML. For central
technocrats working at these ministries, antitrust enforcement is simply
another way of fulfilling their original mission— the ultimate goal being to
gain more policy control within the scope of their designated responsibili-
ties.  To illustrate this, let’s examine NDRC’s behaviour following the enact-
ment of the AML.
B. The Mission of NDRC
While the three central enforcement agencies enjoy the same ministe-
rial rank, NDRC in reality stands out as the far more powerful and
interventionist ministry due to its rich historical and political background.
The predecessor of NDRC was the State Planning Commission (SPC).
Founded in 1952, the SPC played a crucial role when the Chinese economy
was still centrally planned.158  Also known as the little State Council, the
SPC was in charge of the organization of both production and distribution
of major commodities, as well as the construction of significant projects.159
It focused primarily on macroeconomic management and on achieving bal-
ance amongst the three key segments in the economy: finance, material
supplies, and labor.160  The SPC went through several restructurings and
reorganizations over the years.161  The biggest restructuring took place in
2003, two years after China joined the WTO.162  The SPC merged with
part of the State Economic and Trade Commission, another supra-ministe-
rial organization that was primarily responsible for coordinating various
government agencies in order to implement the SPC’s economic plans.163
The State Council also removed “planning” from the SPC’s name and
replaced it with “reform and development,” in order to be seem more com-
patible with China’s goal of building a market economy
156. Telephone interview with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 7,
2014).
157. Mission, SAIC, http://www.saic.gov.cn/english/aboutus/Mission/ (last visited
Oct. 11, 2014).
158. LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 64.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Peter Martin, The Humbling of the NDRC: China’s National Development and
Reform Commission Searches for a New Role Amid Restructuring, THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDA-
TION (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?
tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42057&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=758&no_cache=1#.VB
ZhYvldXNk.
162. See Dexter Roberts, China’s Economic Policy Factory: The NDRC, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (June 20, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-20/chinas-
economic-policy-factory-the-ndrc#p1.
163. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 72.
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Despite this name change, NDRC continued to rely on direct govern-
ment intervention to solve most economic problems;164 this is not surpris-
ing, since promoting government intervention is directly related to NDRC’s
own bureaucratic interests.165  In particular, the responsibilities of price
control fall on the shoulders of two departments within NDRC— the Price
Bureau and the Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau.166  The
Price Bureau is in charge of regulating the price of certain basic commodi-
ties in a number of sectors, including natural gas, diesel, electricity, some
medicines, and basic telecom rates.167  The Price Supervision and Anti-
monopoly Bureau is in charge of preventing price instability, controlling
inflation, and enforcing antitrust laws.  Currently, the Price Supervision
and Anti-Monopoly Bureau is composed of 46 people; one-third are in
charge of antitrust enforcement, while the rest are responsible for price
supervision.168
Since the 1980s, NDRC— including its price control departments— saw
a significant decrease in its power.169  Prices of commodities were increas-
ingly liberalized and the power of the state to mandate prices was signifi-
cantly weakened after China’s entry into the WTO. But experts have
observed that, since the financial crisis in 2008, NDRC has clawed its way
back to dominance due in large part to Hu Jingtao-Wen Jiabao’s govern-
ment focusing more on redistribution and welfare at the expense of further
market reform.170  They note that NDRC took advantage of economic con-
ditions during the crisis and won strong support from the top Chinese
leaders to take charge of a series of important government interventionist
measures, including the battle against inflation.171
164. See id.  See also Roberts, supra note 162.
165. Barry Naughton, Since the National People’s Congress: Personnel and Programs of
Economic Reform Begin to Emerge, 41 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 2 (June 2013), avail-
able at http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM41BN.pdf.
166. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), THE US-CHINA BUSINESS
COUNCIL (2013), http://uschina.org/sites/default/files/NDRC%2006.2013.pdf.
167. Guojia Jiwei He Guowuyuan Youguan Bumen Jiage Mulu [Price Catalog of the State
Planning Commission and Related Ministries of the State Council], NDRC (July 4, 2001),
http://www.sgpi.gov.cn/laws/wj/gjdjml.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
168. Telephone interviews with government officials at a central ministry (Jan. 6,
2013).
169. Barry Naughton, Strengthening the Center, and Premier Wen Jiabao, 21 CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 4– 5 (2007), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/documents/CLM21BN.pdf.
170. Barry Naughton, Inflation, Welfare and the Political Business Cycle, 35 CHINA
LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 7 (2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/documents/CLM35BN.pdf.  This is also confirmed by interviews with government
officials at central ministries.  Interviewees note, however, that NDRC’s power may be
weakened again under the current Chinese leadership who now advocate for further
deepening of market reform. See Telephone interview with a government official at a
central ministry (Jan. 14, 2014).
171. Naughton, Inflation, Welfare and the Political Business Cycle, supra note 170. See
also Barry Naughton, The Inflation Battle: Juggling Three Swords, 25 CHINA LEADERSHIP
MONITOR 1, 6– 9 (2008), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/docu
ments/CLM25BN.pdf.
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Given China’s significant economic liberalization, one may wonder
why the government continues to resort to direct price control rather than
monetary policy to control inflation.  For the CCP leadership, inflation is
not purely an economic matter; it is also a highly sensitive political matter
that has been associated repeatedly with political failures and turmoil in
recent Chinese history.172  Therefore, when inflation became out of control
in 2010, Chinese policymakers elevated the fight against inflation to the
highest priority.173  This provided NDRC with a golden opportunity to step
back into the policymaking limelight.  From December 2010, NDRC
closely monitored the daily prices of primary food products and pressured
merchants not to increase prices.174
In 2011, NDRC started a massive campaign to mobilize merchants,
chambers of commerce, and the public to “whip inflation now.”175  For
example, in April 2011, NDRC invited a number of private chambers of
commerce to meet and pressured them not to increase prices.176  As a
result, 24 of 28 Federation chambers of commerce signed an undertaking
to stabilize prices.177  In May 2011, the Shanghai Price Bureau, a local
agency of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau of NDRC,
fined Unilever RMB 2 million for publicly disseminating its intention to
raise prices and for violating the Price Law.178  The punishment followed
NDRC’s “informal chatting” with Unilever and a number of other leading
household goods manufacturers earlier that month, during which NDRC
suggested that the manufacturers refrain from increasing prices.179
NDRC’s punishment was, however, ineffective, as Unilever reportedly
raised prices in May 2011.180  This time, however, there was nothing that
NDRC could do as Unilever unilaterally raised prices without making a
public announcement.181
172. Naughton, The Inflation Battle: Juggling Three Swords Leadership, supra note 171,
at 1– 2 (associating inflation events with political turmoil such as unrest at Tiananmen
Square in 1989).
173. Naughton, Inflation, Welfare and the Political Business Cycle, supra note 170, at 2.
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id.
178. Lian He Li Hua Sanbu Zhangjia Xingxi Raoluan Shichang Zhixu Shoudao Yanli
Chufa [Unilever Received Harsh Penalty for Disseminating Price Increase Information and
Disrupting Market Order], NDRC PRESS RELEASE (May 6, 2011), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/
fzgggz/jggl/zhdt/201105/t20110506_410568.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
179. Fa Gai Wei Yuetan Xiangguan Qiye Shiping Rihua Ye Zhangjia Zhan Huan [NDRC
Invited Relevant Enterprise for Informal Chatting, Food and Household Industries to Slow
Price Increase], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC REPORT] (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20110330/22539619505.shtml (last visited Nov. 4,
2014).
180. Fa Gai Wei: Lian He Li Hua Cici Zhangjia Bu Weifa Bu Chufa [NDRC: The Price
Increase of Unilever This Time Doesn’t Violate the Law and Hence No Penalty], XIN JING
BAO [BEIJING NEWS] (May 27, 2011), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/14751606
.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
181. Id.
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C. Using the AML as A New Tool for Policy Control
In recent years, NDRC has started to appreciate the AML as a powerful
tool for fulfilling its original mission of “price control” without appearing
as though NDRC is undermining market forces.  Two recent, high-profile
cases illustrate this point.  Both cases concerned minimum resale price
maintenance (RPM) conduct by wholesale manufacturers.  The first case
involved Maotai and Wuliangye, two premium Chinese liquor companies
that had imposed price restraints on their distributors and penalized those
selling liquor at a discount (the white liquor case).182  The second case
involved a number of high-end infant formula powder manufacturers that
had allegedly fixed the downstream retail prices of their products and had
adopted various measures to prevent discounting by retailers (the milk
powder case).183  Notably, white liquor and milk powder are two products
that have been closely monitored by NDRC.184  In 2008, NDRC invoked
Article 30 of the Price Law, authorizing the government to temporarily
intervene in certain pricing decisions in the case of emergent inflationary
pressures;185 milk powder was one of the commodities subject to NDRC’s
temporary price control, and NDRC sent an emergency notice to all local
provincial authorities to ensure compliance with its measures.186  In 2011,
on separate occasions, NDRC invited manufacturers of infant formula milk
powder and premium white liquor for “informal chatting” and pressured
them to refrain from increasing prices;187 however, these companies con-
182. See Wuliangye Decision, supra note 128;Maotai Decision, supra note 128.
183. See Milk Powder Decision, supra note 37.
184. NDRC publishes periodic reports monitoring the prices of white liquor. See, e.g.,
NDRC Jia Ge Jiance Zhongxin [Price Supervision Center], 2008 Nian 10 Yue 1 Xun 36 Ge
Da Zhong Chengshi Baijiu Jiage Hangqing Biao [White Liquor Prices in 36 Large and
Medium-Size Cities in October 2008] (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/
jggl/jgsjgjc/200810/t20081029_586697.html(last visited Nov. 4, 2014); see infra foot-
notes 186 and 187 on NDRC’s monitoring of the prices of milk powder and white liquor.
185. Price Law of the People’s Republic of China, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEO-
PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA , art. 30, http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/
Businessregulations/201303/20130300046121.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2014); see
also Guojia Fa Gai Wei Guanyu Dui Bufen Zhongyao Shangping Ji Fuwu Shixing Lingshi
Jiage Ganyu Cuoshi De Shishi Bangfa [The Provisional Measures by NDRC regarding the
Exercise of Temporary Price Intervention of Certain Important Products and Ser-
vices](promulgated by NDRC, Jan. 15, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-01/16/con
tent_860257.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
186. Guojia Fagaiwei Fachu Jingji Tongzhi Yaoqiu Qieshi Jiaqiang Yingyouer Naifen Jiage
Jianguan [NDRC Sent Emergency Notice Requesting the Strengthening of the Supervision of
the Prices of Infant Formula], NDRC PRESS RELEASE (Sep. 19, 2008), http://zys.ndrc
.gov.cn/xwfb/200809/t20080919_236569.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
187. Maotai Deng Baijiu Lun Fan Zhangjia Fa Gai Wei Zai Yuetan Yaoqiu Wending
Wujia [Maotai and Other White Liquor Companies Increase Price Again, NDRC Asks for
Informal Chatting Requesting the Stabilization of Prices], GUANGZHOU RI BAO [GUANGZHOU
DAILY] (Sept. 23, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-09/23/c_122075707
.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014); Meiti Cheng Fa Gai Wei Yuetan Liu Jia Yang Nai Feng
[Media Claims NDRC Informally Chatted with Six Foreign Milk Powder Manufacturers],
SOUTHERN CHINA WEEKEND (May 27, 2011), http://www.infzm.com/content/59015 (last
visited Nov. 4, 2014).
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tinued to raise prices despite repeated warnings from NDRC.188
The complaints about their RPM practices therefore provided NDRC
with the perfect opportunity to rein in the white liquor and infant formula
powder prices.  A few days after NDRC’s announcement of its investigation
into the infant milk powder industry, Wyeth announced that it would
cooperate with NDRC’s investigation, rectify its behavior immediately, and
lower its wholesale prices by an average of eleven percent.189  Other milk
powder manufacturers quickly followed suit.190  In the end, Wyeth and
two other infant formula manufacturers were rewarded with total immu-
nity for proactive cooperation with NDRC, while the other three manufac-
turers received a fine totaling RMB 668 million.191  From an antitrust law
perspective, however, it is unusual that these milk powder manufacturers
would agree to lower their prices as part of the proposed remedies for a
RPM case.  Such an “unusual” remedy is, however, perfectly consistent with
our hypothesis that NDRC’s main goal for the investigation was to control
prices; these manufacturers simply gave NDRC what it wanted.192
Indeed, almost all of the major cases brought in the last three years by
NDRC have involved basic daily consumption goods that have been subject
to price monitoring, including pharmaceutical products, dairy products,
liquor, broadband access, and consumer electronics.193  The only excep-
tion is NDRC’s recent investigation into a cartel involving Shanghai gold
retailers.194  But a closer look at that case reveals that it too was consistent
with NDRC’s mission to maintain price stability.  In April 2013, a steep
decline in gold prices led to a frenzy among Chinese consumers who
rushed to buy gold.195  Gold hoarding signals price instability and the fra-
gility of the Chinese economy.196  NDRC’s antitrust investigation into col-
188. Guan Bu Liao Lingshou Shang, 53 Du Fei Tian Maotai Zai Zhangjia 200 Yuan
[Cannot Control Retailers, 53 Degree Feitian Maotai Increases Prices by RMB200], ZHONG-
GUO JINGYING WANG [CHINA MANAGEMENT NET] (Sept. 26, 2011), http://jingji.cntv.cn/
20110926/108915.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2014); Hui Shi Deng Yang Nai Fen Jiti
Zhangjia Zhuangjia Cheng Maoli Lu Gao Da 60% [Wyeth and Other Foreign Milk Powder
Companies Increase Prices, Experts Suggest the Gross Margin Reaches 60%], DONG FANG
ZAO BAO [ORIENTAL DAILY] (July 6, 2011), http://finance.sina.com.cn/consume/
20110706/081610100864.shtml (last visited  Nov. 3, 2014).
189. Fa Gai Wei Shi Yi Hui Shi Mian Zao Zhong Fa : Shouxian Jiangjia Shuai Dui
Rencuo [NDRC Explains Why Wyeth Received Immunity Because It Was The First One to
Admit Guilt and to Lower Price], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC REPORT]
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130808/022816379184
.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
190. Id.
191. Milk Powder Decision, supra note 37.
192. Yang Nai Feng Weihe Zao Yu Fan Longduan [Why Foreign Milk Powder Manufactur-
ers Were Investigated for Antitrust Violations], SOUTHERN CHINA WEEKEND (July 13, 2013),
http://www.infzm.com/content/92316 (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
193. See supra Part III.
194. See Gold Retailer Decision, supra note 129.
195. See Chinese Mothers Beat Wall Street to Force Gold Price Rebound, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (May 3, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/business/commodities/article/
1228786/gold-short-sellers-lose-chinese-mothers-buying-their-daughters.
196. See China Goes Gold Crazy. Why Now?, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2013/04/28/china-goes-gold-crazy-why-now/.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN306.txt unknown Seq: 29 12-JAN-15 10:25
2014 Bureaucratic Politics 699
lusive pricing among gold retailers thus served the function of “cooling
down” gold hoarding behavior.  In fact, NDRC has not shied away from
making it clear that its antitrust enforcement priority is to maintain the
price stability of basic commodities.  In November 2013, Lu Yanchun, the
Deputy Director General of the Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly
Bureau, announced that the department would continue to prioritize its
enforcement efforts against price-related monopolies in six major indus-
tries: aviation, household chemicals, automobiles, telecoms, pharmaceuti-
cals, and home appliances.197
In addition to price control, NDRC has another important mission:
formulating industrial policy and coordinating industry planning.198  It
allocates this responsibility to the Industry Coordination Bureau, a sister
bureau of the Price Supervision and Anti-monopoly Bureau and the Price
Bureau. The same deputy director, Zucai Hu, simultaneously oversees
these three bureaus.199 (See Figure 3 below).  Not surprisingly, NDRC
recently initiated a number of high-profile investigations that have far-
reaching implications for the competitive structure of domestic industries.
These investigations include current antitrust probes into American tech-
nology firms such as Qualcomm and InterDigital.200  In both cases, Chi-
nese manufacturers rely heavily on SEPs provided by the American firms,
and thus an NDRC antitrust investigation can provide these Chinese manu-
facturers with more bargaining power during negotiations for the license of
SEPs.201












Other Deputy Directors and
Deputy Director-Level 
Officials
197. Guojia Jiang Zhongdian Yanguan Liu Da Hangye De Jiage Longduan Xingwei
[China Will Closely Monitor Prices in Six Major Industries], XINHUA NET (Nov. 24, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-11/24/c_118270369.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2014).
198. Main Functions of the NDRC, supra note 119.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Qualcomm Faces Prospect of Record Antitrust Fine in China, REUTERS (Jan.
28, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-qualcomm-china-idUSBREA
0S06020140129.
201. See id.; see also InterDigital News, supra note 130.
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IV. The Motives and Behavior of Local Enforcement Agencies
Unlike MOFCOM, both NDRC and SAIC have massive networks of cor-
responding bureaus at various levels of the regional governments.202
NDRC and SAIC can delegate their enforcement responsibilities to their
corresponding local authorities— the Development Reform Commission
(DRC) and Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC), respec-
tively— and thus, in theory, each agency has thousands of staff members to
carry out antitrust enforcement functions.203  Based on the decisions dis-
closed by NDRC and SAIC, local antitrust agencies initiated and enforced
the vast majority of cases.  For instance, as of October 31, 2014, SAIC has
publicly announced sixteen decisions, all of which were initiated and inves-
tigated by local AIC agencies with SAIC providing professional support.204
Considering SAIC’s vast network of enforcement staff at the local level, this
record is hardly impressive.  In fact, authorities from only eleven provinces
brought those sixteen cases, meaning that almost two-thirds of the prov-
inces have not brought a single antitrust case in the past five years.205
The enforcement pattern of local DRC authorities sheds similar light
on the predicament of local enforcement.  While local DRC authorities
seem to have brought a number of high-profile cases (e.g. the gold retailer
case and the white liquor case), NDRC in Beijing in fact took the lead
behind the scenes.206  For instance, NDRC first initiated the white liquor
case, and only subsequently was enforcement authority delegated to local
DRC authorities.207  Critics also note that the fines imposed on Maotai and
Wuliangye were too lenient as these two firms were only fined 1% of
annual sales in 2012.208  Similarly, although the decision to fine large gold
retailers in Shanghai was made by Shanghai DRC, NDRC in Beijing was
actively involved during the investigation.209  Shanghai DRC had long been
aware of the collusive practices among these large gold retailers,210 but
until that point it had only tried to persuade them to cease such practices
202. While MOFCOM also has corresponding bureaus at the provincial level, those
provincial bureaus are not in charge of merger review.
203. Telephone interview with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 6,
2014).  Note that some of the local corresponding offices of NDRC are called price
bureaus, but for simplicity, we refer to all local authorities of NDRC as DRCs.
204. See SAIC’s decisions, supra note 122.
205. See id.
206. Telephone interview with a government official at a central ministry (Jan. 6,
2014).
207. Id.
208. Fang Longduan Maotai Wuliangye Shou Da Fadan Fan Hengxiang Longduan Jiang
Gengju Weishe Li [Maotai and Wuliangye Received Large Antitrust Fines, Anti-Horizontal
Price Monopoly Will Have Greater Deterrence], XINGHUA WANG [XINHUA NET](Feb. 26,
2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-02/26/c_114799452.htm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2014); Zhuanjia Tan Xianzhi Zuidi Zhuang Shou Jiage: Ci Qian Dui Maotai
Wuliangye Chufa Guo Qing [Expert Discusses Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Punish-
ment on Maotai and Wuliangye is Too Lenient], IBTIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www
.ibtimes.com.cn/articles/30703/20130703/384416.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
209. Telephone interview with an antitrust lawyer involved in this case (Dec. 8, 2014).
210. Id.
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without resorting to any legal action.211  These gold retailers had not been
investigated for AML violations until a tipoff to NDRC in Beijing.212 So
how do we explain the apparent lack of interest in prosecuting antitrust
cases demonstrated by local AIC and DRC authorities?  Again, the answer
lies in the incentive structure of local enforcement agencies and the con-
straints these agencies face in the CCP-hierarchy.
A. Decentralized Regional Autonomy
The Chinese bureaucratic system is unitary.  Local governments derive
their authority from the central government.213  For instance, each of the
central ministries in Beijing has a corresponding bureau at the provincial
level, but the provincial bureau is also a component of the provincial gov-
ernment.214  Therefore, the provincial antitrust bureau simultaneously
serves two principals— the provincial government and the ministry in Beij-
ing.215  However, within the CCP hierarchy, ministries and provincial gov-
ernments are of the same bureaucratic rank.216  Bureaucratic rank remains
particularly important in China because agencies at the same rank cannot
issue binding orders to each other.217  A question then arises: when there
is a conflict between the provincial government and the ministry, whose
preference takes priority?  For the system to operate smoothly, the Chinese
government specifies that the primary line of leadership is administrative
leadership, and the secondary line of leadership is professional leadership.
With the exception of a few vertically integrated ministries, the provincial
governments control the appointment of personnel and the budget of most
of the provincial bureaus; thus, the provincial governments have the pri-
mary line of leadership over those agencies.218  Meanwhile, the central
ministries issue guidelines, instructions and non-binding directives to the
provincial bureaus.219  In the case of DRC and AIC authorities, the provin-
cial governments have the primary line of control because they control
local authorities’ personnel appointments and budget.220  Therefore, the
provincial governments’ preference takes priority over that of NDRC and
SAIC.
When does the provincial governments’ preferences diverge from that
of NDRC and SAIC?  The answer again has to do with the bureaucratic
incentive structure.  Since central ministries are organized by function or
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. HUANG, supra note 15, at 28.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 28– 32 (discussing generally how provincial bureaus simultaneously
serve the provincial government and the central ministry).
216. LIEBERTHAL, supra note 73, at 236 (Figure 7.1 shows that ministry and province
are of equivalent rank).
217. Susan V. Lawrence & Michael F. Martin, Understanding China’s Political System,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 15 (Mar. 20, 2013), available at http://fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/R41007.pdf.
218. See LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 349.
219. See id. at 149.
220. Telephone interview with an AIC official (Jan. 15, 2014).
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by sector, they have their own often well-defined spheres of responsibil-
ity.221  In comparison, provincial governments have all-encompassing
responsibilities because their organizational structures mimic the organiza-
tion of the central government.222  Huang notes that the division between
provincial bureaucrats and ministerial bureaucrats corresponds roughly to
multi-task bureaucrats and single-task bureaucrats.223  When an agent
needs to perform multiple tasks, it becomes more costly to monitor the
agent and evaluate his performance directly.224  To align the interest of the
principal and the agent, it is therefore more efficient to give the agent a
high-powered incentive rather than rely on direct monitoring.
This theoretical prediction thus makes it easy to understand the logic
behind the mechanisms that the central government applies to control pro-
vincial governments.  First, the central government controls the career
paths of provincial leaders using the nomenklatura cadre management sys-
tem.225  Second, the central government awards high-powered incentives to
the provincial governments by expanding their financial autonomy and
sharing the economic surplus with them.226  Known as fiscal decentraliza-
tion, the scheme has been regarded as the cornerstone of the CCP leaders’
political strategy to build support for economic reform.227  These coexist-
ing features of highly centralized personnel control and highly decentral-
ized regional autonomy have led economist Chenggang Xu to characterize
China as a “regionally decentralized authoritarian regime.”228
But decentralization is a double-edged sword.  While it provides
regional governments with incentives to focus on tasks that are more
directly observable and measurable (e.g., GDP growth and foreign direct
investment), it also induces moral hazard— for example, ignoring those
tasks that are less-measurable and less-observable.229  Soon after fiscal
decentralization was introduced in 1980, local protectionism began to
emerge.230  As regional governments competed fiercely for economic
growth within their own jurisdictions, decentralization increased the incen-
tives as well as the range of political means through which local govern-
ments could erect trade barriers and ban imports.231
The consequences of local protectionism are severe.  First, it artifi-
cially carves up a large single Chinese market into smaller segments, reduc-
ing the size of the market as well as the quality of market demand.232
221. Huang, supra note 64, at 66– 67.
222. Id. at 67– 68.
223. Id. at 68.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 69– 74 (Noting a number of indirect mechanisms that aim at aligning the
preferences of provincial leaders with those of the central government, such as cross-
posting, appointment, rotation, and promotion).
226. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 149; see also Xu, supra note 18, at 1098– 107.
227. Xu, supra note 18, at 1098– 107.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 1129.
230. SHIRK, supra note 17, at 186.
231. See Montinola et al., supra note 18, at 65.
232. HUANG, supra note 18, at 313.
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Second, it alters the industry structure of the Chinese economy.  For both
political and economic reasons, regional governments have incentives to
impose a variety of formal and informal constraints on firms to prevent
them from expanding outside of their own territories.233  This results in a
paradoxical phenomenon.  When Chinese industries are assessed on a
national level, the concentration is very low because firms tend to be small
and uncompetitive compared with their foreign counterparts.234  At the
same time, despite the lack of competitiveness of these regional firms,
monopolies can still arise as regional governments erect trade barriers to
prevent imports into their jurisdictions.
Over the past three decades, the central government has exerted signif-
icant effort to police the common market.  In 1980, the State Council
issued a regulation prohibiting regional blockades on purchasing and mar-
keting industrial products— a piece of regulation that has often been
deemed the first competition law in China.235  Since then, the central gov-
ernment has repeatedly intervened and issued decrees to curb regional pro-
tectionism.236  But the effects of these measures to police the common
market are ambiguous, and economists are still intensely debating whether
regional economic fragmentation has worsened during the reform.237  In
fact, the AML has devoted a chapter on “administrative monopoly” which is
specifically designed to tackle issues of local protectionism.238  Unfortu-
nately, actual enforcement against “administrative monopolies” is very
weak.239  In late 2013, twelve central ministries, including MOFCOM, the
Legal Affairs Office of the State Council, NDRC, and the Ministry of
Finance and State Administration of Taxation, jointly released a notice on
overhauling regional blockade rules for industries across the country.240
The fact that the removal of regional blockades remains a high priority for
the central government testifies to the persistence and severity of the prob-
lem of local protectionism.
233. Id. at 271– 72.
234. See World Bank Report 2030, supra note 3, at 112.
235. Guowuyuan Guanyu Kaizhan He Baohu Shehui Zhuyi Jingzheng De Zanxing
Guiding [State Council Provisional Regulations on Developing and Protecting Socialist
Competition] (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 17, 1980, effective Oct. 17, 1980,
abolished Oct.6, 2001) (Lawinfochina) (China); see also Jung & Hao, supra note 2, at
127– 28.
236. Xu, supra note 18, at 1134.
237. Id. at 1134– 35.
238. The AML, supra note 1, ch. V.
239. See generally Xu Shiying & Zhang Baisha, Judicial and Administrative Remedies
against Administrative Monopoly: Cases and Analysis, in CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE
FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 5, at 271.
240. See Shangwubu Shuiwu Zongju Deng Shi Er Bumeng Bushu Kaizhang Xiaochu
Difang Fengsuo Dapo Hangye Longduan Gongzuo [Twelve Ministries Including MOFCOM,
State Administration of Taxation  Are Conducting Measures  to Eradicate Regional Block-
ades and Eliminate Industry Monopoly], MOFCOM Press Release (Dec. 10, 2013), http://
www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/201312/20131200419641.shtml (last visited Nov. 3,
2014).
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B. The Predicament of Local Enforcement
When provincial governments engaged in a race to the bottom by
erecting trade barriers and banning imports from other regions, they cre-
ated market conditions conducive to the rise of monopolies at the local
level.  This explains local enforcement agencies’ lack of interest in tackling
regional monopolies, as these monopolies are deemed local champions
and are important contributors to the local GDP.  On the other hand, if it is
local protectionism that has contributed to the lax local enforcement, one
should expect local authorities to have no interest in bringing any antitrust
cases at all.  But that is also not true, as all of the sixteen cases announced
by SAIC were initiated by local authorities.  The answer to this puzzle again
has to do with the bureaucratic incentive structures of AICs.  Over the
years, AICs have seen their power encroached upon by other government
agencies, such as those in charge of product quality, intellectual property,
and food safety.241  Some local AIC officials are therefore concerned about
their careers and the continuing existence of their departments.242  Anti-
trust enforcement thus provides AIC officials with a new form of policy
control and accordingly is deemed an exciting new venture.243  Notably, in
some jurisdictions administrative fining is an important source of revenue
for local governments who set a fining target and then evaluate the salaries
and bonuses of AIC officials with regards to whether they have achieved
that fining target.244  Odd compensation schemes like this turn local offi-
cials into high-powered incentive agents and gives them perverse incentives
to aggressively fine companies until they meet the target, and then post-
pone enforcement once the target is fulfilled.245
Another reason that regional monopolies escape local enforcement is
the bureaucratic structure of AICs.  Concerned about rampant food and
pharmaceutical safety issues, the central government requested in 1998
that a number of government departments in charge of product quality
(including provincial AICs) consolidate their offices within their respective
provincial regions and become vertically integrated.246  Vertical integration
means that each provincial AIC exercises administrative leadership over all
AIC offices within its respective region and controls their personnel and
budgets.247  Therefore, provincial AICs have primary leadership over those
agencies, and thus their preferences take priority over those of lower-level
regional governments.  Not surprisingly, some provincial AIC offices have
incentives to encourage AIC offices to tackle small local monopolies arising





246. Telephone interview with an AIC official (Jan. 15, 2014).  For detailed analysis
of this structural change, see Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” Centralization: Shifting
Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA Q. 791, 794– 95 (2005).
247. Chuixiang Chuizhi Guangli De Lenfeng [Cold Winds Blowing to Vertical Manage-
ment], LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK WEEKLY] (Nov. 27, 2009), http://lw.xinhuanet.com/htm/
content_4856.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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at the lower regional level (i.e., the city, county, or township level).  How-
ever, in 2011 the State Council removed the requirement for vertical inte-
gration of AIC offices at the provincial level, and thus some provinces again
delegated primary leadership to lower regional governments.248  It should
also be noted that there is no vertical integration with provincial DRCs;
each level of the regional government has administrative leadership over
the DRC office in its respective region.249
Conclusion and Implications
Judge Posner once famously said that “antitrust deals with what are at
root economic phenomena.”250  This succinct statement captures the
underlying logic of antitrust, which allows governments to intervene when
the market fails.  But when the AML is asked to deal with rampant protec-
tionism by local governments and to tackle the monopolistic behaviour of
SOEs, it then deals with what are not at root market failures, but rather
government failures.251  The idiosyncrasies of China’s antitrust law are
found not only in its intentions, but also in its enforcement process.  Upon
opening the black box of the political decision-making process, we find
that antitrust enforcement in China is in fact a highly pluralistic process
involving officials from various central government ministries and local
government agencies.  The incentive structure and the formal and tacit
rules of the Chinese bureaucracy shape the enforcement outcome of the
AML.  Posner’s statement therefore demands a modification when applied
to the Chinese context: there, antitrust law deals with what are at root not
economic phenomena, but rather political phenomena.
Although the CCP clearly has a monopoly on governmental power in
China, including law enforcement, authority below the very peak of the
political system is fragmented and disjointed.252  When the CCP leader-
ship delegates authority to various agencies with overlapping functions and
competing missions and objectives, power becomes fragmented among
248. Shengji Yixia Gongshang Zhijian Bumeng Gaizhi, Zeren Yu Wushamao Xiangliang
[AICs and Quality Supervision Departments from Below Provincial Levels Change Struc-
ture, Responsibilities Are Tied to Official Posts], CHINA.COM (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www
.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-11/08/content_23850463.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2014).
249. Telephone interview with an AIC official (Jan. 15, 2014).
250. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 (2d ed. 2001).
251. It should be noted that it is quite common for antitrust law to have aspirations
other than economic efficiency and that China is not unique in this regard.  EU competi-
tion law, for instance, has been tasked with the overriding political goal of creating a
single market, which does not necessarily coincide with the objective of maximizing
economic efficiency. See Commission Notice on Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 2010
O.J. (C 130/1) 100 (explicitly incorporating the single market objective into the vertical
guidelines and discussing potentially negative effects of vertical restraints); see also
Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 299. See
also VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE
66– 68 (9th ed. 2007) (criticizing the European Commission’s mechanical application of
the single market goal without properly taking into account the economic effects).
252. LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 6, at 8.
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various government actors.  The endless struggle among these government
actors for control of policy therefore accounts for the heterogeneity of
China’s seemingly paradoxical antitrust enforcement outcome.  Conven-
tional analysis of the AML therefore puts the cart before the horse in argu-
ing that Chinese policymakers have the single objective of maximizing
national interests in adopting and implementing the AML.  This wrongly
assumes that policy enforcement is determined by economic objectives.
But protectionism is not the cause of the politicized enforcement— rather, it
is its outcome.  As illustrated by consensus building in merger enforce-
ment, the incorporation of industrial policy into merger decisions is in fact
the result of a protracted process that involves intense negotiation and bar-
gaining between MOFCOM and the other government agencies that have a
say in AML enforcement.
For the most part, China’s antitrust enforcement is a centralized pro-
cess promoted by MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC in Beijing.  For central tech-
nocrats employed at these agencies, their main objective is to maximize
their departments’ policy control, which is directly tied to their factional
interests and hence their career prospects.  As each Chinese enforcement
agency is nested within a different ministry, their divergent responsibilities
and political missions shape their enforcement priorities, as amply demon-
strated in the case of NDRC’s attempt to use the AML as a tool to maintain
price stability and fulfill industrial policy goals.  At the same time, the cen-
tral government’s attempt to use the AML as a tool to police the internal
common market seems unlikely to be successful.  While local enforcement
agencies clearly desire to increase their antitrust policy control, they are
faced with the constraints imposed by local governments, which have pref-
erences that take priority over that of the central ministries.  Accordingly,
unless central ministries intervene, the reliance on local enforcement is
unlikely to be effective in tackling local monopolies, particularly those that
are supported by strong political ties with local governments.
Although this Article is limited to China, its findings have implications
for the general study of antitrust law in transitional economies.  Antitrust
law was first built upon a market economy where the government was only
called upon to intervene when the market was imperfect.  But as antitrust
law globalizes and proliferates in other parts of the world, including transi-
tional economies such as China, the functions of the law have changed.
The AML was called upon not only to correct market imperfections, but
also institutional imperfections such as economic fragmentation and
entrenched state-owned monopolies— outcomes of deliberate political
choices made by the Chinese leadership.  Moreover, as antitrust law was
initially enforced in democratic countries with strong judicial oversight of
government actions, antitrust scholars have often neglected the complex
bureaucratic process itself as an important determinant of antitrust policy
outcomes.  China is an excellent example that illustrates how bureaucratic
politics matter for antitrust enforcement.  Without effective judicial super-
vision, Chinese enforcement agencies have essentially monopolized the
administrative enforcement of the AML and turned it into an elusive politi-
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cal process.  This also suggests that any proposal to reform AML enforce-
ment that fails to address the fundamental problems with the underpinning
institutions (e.g., lack of judicial independence) is likely to only generate
cosmetic results.
The findings in this Article also have general implications for the
study of other areas of Chinese law.  China is a vast country, and the
enforcement of its laws often hinges upon a large, decentralized network of
administrative agencies.  Examination of the bureaucratic structure of
administrative enforcement, the policy processes, and the incentives and
constraints faced by enforcement agencies within the CCP-dominated hier-
archy is therefore essential to understanding the law enforcement outcome.
Over the past three decades, China has proven to the world that it is
able to carry out successful economic transformations without political
reform.  But the liberalization of the economy has in turn produced pres-
sure for political reform.  Without effective judicial oversight, arbitrary
enforcement of the AML is bound to do more harm than good in regulating
the Chinese economy.  This does not bode well for further market reform
in China.  The enforcement of the AML is therefore another example of the
predicament that the Chinese leadership faces in governing and reforming
the country.
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